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Iran: Asymmetric Strategy and Mass Diplomacy
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of Iran’s information and mass diplomacy efforts in terms
of its use of traditional written and audio-visual media, as well as through internet-based
ones. Iran’s information efforts are both at the centre of its national strategy in dealing
with its adversaries and its domestic policies to maintain and protect the regime.
Furthermore, it is also well-aligned with the overall Iranian doctrine to take 360 degree
approach to security, while avoiding direct military confrontation. A better understanding
of Iran’s approach and inherent logic behind its information warfare can help anticipating
the country’s next move.
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Introduction
Iran’s Power Seen from Different Lenses
The Trump administration, like previous ones since the Islamic Revolution
of 1979, perceives Iran as a threat to the interests of the United States. The
U.S. National Security Strategy of December 2017 notes that one of its
objectives is to “neutralize Iranian malign influence” in the Middle East.1
Yet, the main tools to reach this objective appear to be hard power ones,
especially in the form of economic strangulation, covert operations, and
limited military actions. Markedly, in May 2018, the United States
withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action meant to prevent
Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, and re-imposed stiff
economic sanctions against the country. In January 2020, the United
States launched a drone strike in Iraq, killing General Qasem Soleimani,
commander of the Iranian Qud Force.
Although soft power is been used too, such as the promotion of democracy,
internet freedom, and public diplomacy towards Iran, they are pale if
compared to the hard power side. For instance, Radio Farda based in
Prague receives $11 million per year, the Persian service of Voice of
America about $20 million, and the Near East Regional Democracy
programming $15 million in 2019.2 Such significant imbalance of hard
versus soft power is not a new phenomenon in American foreign policy.3
In the years that followed the invasion of Iraq, a substantive academic and
practitioners’ literature emphasized that the United States and its allies
were engaged in a “war of ideas,” where economic and military means are
poor tools to change anti-Western attitudes, ways of thinking, and
ultimately policies in foreign lands.4 It appears that the United States is at
risk of falling into same mistake when it comes to Iran, and achieving its
objective of neutralizing Iranian malign influence to become even further
remote.5
This paper seeks to illustrate that the depth and extensive capabilities of
the Iranian soft power is likely to prevent United States’ goal to undermine
Tehran’s influence in the region significantly. To do so, first it proposes an
overview of the Iranian’s soft power approach to show the centrality and
qualitative depth of Iran’s influence strategy. The second part emphasizes
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the variety of means used by Iran to sustain such influence, especially in
the open domain of public diplomacy. The paper concludes with a short
reflection on the challenges that such asymmetry of approach might bring
to American foreign policy and security.

Iran’s approach to soft power in a context of encirclement
“Raise your speech, not your voice. It is the rain that grows flower, not the
thunder,” wrote the mystical Persian poet of the 13th century, Jalāl ad-Dīn
Muhammad Rūmī, thus illustrating the long-lasting and deep-seated place
that soft power occupies in the Iranian collective psyche. Prone to feelings
of geopolitical encirclement, Iranians are convinced that in both domestic
and foreign policy, the spirit of conquest is inseparable from the conquest
of minds. Throughout its history, Iran was oftentimes threaten by other
nations and found itself in situations of military inferiority, requiring to
implement indirect approaches that the Ismaili and Parthians of Ancient
times already used effectively. Avoiding frontal combat and striking where
the adversary expects it the least have been at the core of Iran’s way to
survival. From the taqia to ketman and to the khod'eh and the tārof,
Iranians have a wide array of well-defined forms of feints and tricks to
draw from, accumulated through centuries in battlefields, palaces’
gardens, and bazars’ warehouses.6 In modern times, the Iran-Iraq War,
the Gulf War, and the overwhelming U.S. presence in the region have
further convinced the Iranian leadership that the Islamic Republic cannot
succeed through direct confrontation against its regional adversaries and
beyond, and that the country must invest in an indirect approach, giving a
significant role to media influence and information weaponization.7
As noted by François Thual, Iran always perceived its geopolitical position
through an obsidional prism, or siege mentality, apprehensive about the
constant threats posed by states and nations surrounding it.8 Shireen
Hunter highlights that Iran, being the only Persian-speaking and Shia
country in a neighborhood, made of a majority of Turkish-Arabic Sunnites,
cannot count on any natural ethno-cultural solidarity to deal with external
threats.9 To these reasons underlying the Iranian feelings of isolation, one
can add that the country is both too big and too small all at once. Major
players on the international stage cannot ignore it, and yet, it is too small
and weak to deter them.
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These double feelings of weakness and strategic isolation have led Iranians
to develop historically two strategic imperatives: First, protect “fortress
Iran” by preserving its economic autonomy and its territorial integrity
while, second, actively projecting its influence throughout the region to
create a protective buffer. Although they may appear contradictory on the
surface, these two strategic “reflexes” are in fact complementary and
mutually reinforcing, and are transcending internal ideological differences
and implementable through both an offensive approach [tahājomi], such
the one practiced by Ahmadinejad, or through a Rohāni-style détente
strategy.10
Propaganda, ideological persuasion, and public diplomacy are central to
the Islamic regime’s survival and promotion of its interests.11 At the end of
the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War, it became clear to the regime
that it found itself in a weakened position, however, it is only at the
beginning of the 2000s that the Iranian strategy grows to maturity and
becomes truly institutionalized. This period also coincides with the
increasing importance and role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC – in Persian: Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enghelāb-e Eslāmi or Pasdaran
for short). On the domestic front, the IRGC’s main informational objective
is to protect the regime from what the leadership calls “color revolutions”
and “soft coup d’état” attempts, which according to them are plotted by its
regional and extra-regional adversaries.12 It is under this light that the
Iranian government regularly accuses Web giants, such as Facebook or
Twitter, to support “anti-regime propaganda.”13 The Pasdarans are
responsible for counter-subversion activities through modern
communication systems to extinguish “sedition” and to rally public
opinion around the regime.14
Initially limited to rudimentary and outdated propaganda tools, this effort
to shepherd doctrinally Iran’s population is now an impressive and
modern array of psychological warfare resources, with the Supreme
Guide’s Office as one of its leading parts. Originally created as an ad hoc
function, the Office became rapidly the nerve centre of the Iranian
informational effort. It has its own publication, the monthly Sobhe-e
Sadegh, as well as a network of cultural institutes, and think thanks comanaged with the Ministry of Culture, the Organization for the
Propagation of Islam, and the Islamic Republic information agency known
as IRIB. In the same vein, the Pasdarans have a more or less direct control
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over many opinion media, such as the influential Keyhān newspaper and
the IRIB itself that are normally led by individuals drawn from among the
Guards. These tools, combined with the exploitation of social media,
support the internal propaganda to maintain a favorable public opinion
towards the Islamic Republic.15
On the external front, strategic communications comprehensively
integrate the approach of seeking to extend Iran’s influence and fight
regional and extra-regional influence.16 Early on, the Guards have invested
in subversive activities abroad, allegedly to protect people “oppressed” by
imperialism.17 During the last decade, the IRGC has integrated into their
standard procedures the use of social media and communication networks
to achieve the following political objective: Deter its adversaries in creating
confusion and by spreading disinformation about their capabilities and
real intentions, while aiming at their own public opinion as an indirect
mean to influence their own government’s actions.18 As Arsali noted, the
Guards’ strategic messages seek to challenge adversaries, mislead their
enemies’ armed forces about Iran’s military capabilities, deter them from
military interventions, and convince them of the regime’s robustness.19
This influence system extends at the regional level through the Quds Force
(formerly led by General Soleimani) whose function is to cultivate linkages
with Shiites and pro-Iranian organizations such as the Lebanese
Hezbollah. In the Lebanese context, this includes spreading pro-regime
messages through a network of mosques and husseiniyyas [religious
meeting locales], as well as through medias linked to the IRIB.20 Over
time, Iran and its regional allies were able to grow a significant place for
themselves on the regional scene, as the leaders of the anti-Israeli, antiSaudi, and so-called anti-Western “Resistance Front.”21

A sophisticated and multi-layer public diplomacy
At first centralized, Iran’s public diplomacy mutated into a bureaucraticentrepreneur model aimed at minimizing the state’s direct involvement
and to use as much as possible private or foreign partners.22 The goal is to
legitimise the Islamic regimes’ international policy and to present Iran
under a more positive light. Consequently, the slogan [shoar] is to show
the world that Iran is both open and tolerant or, alternately, to fight what
the regime calls Iranophobia [in Persian Iran Harāssi] allegedly
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emanating from its adversaries’ propaganda.23 Furthermore, it is about
implementing one of the pillars of the Islamic Republic’s diplomatic
doctrine: Developing fruitful political, economic, and military
relationships in the four corners of the globe while imposing itself as an
actor that matters on the international stage.
The IRIB as the “conductor”
While bolstering the Pasdaran’s political influence, the IRIB is the
principal agency in charge of coordinating the various organizations
involved in Iran’s audio-visual diplomacy. With an annual budget of over a
billion dollars, branches in 20 countries in various regions of the world,
particularly in Germany, Brazil, Malaysia, and the United States, the IRIB
is the “conductor” of the Iranian influence strategy.24 In this regard, such
services broadcast the regime’s values and defend “the Islamic Republic
government’s official position on major international issues.”25
Another series of official institutions complement the Iranian audio-visual
diplomatic system. For cultural content, the IRIB is working with the
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Orientation, and especially with the
Islamic Relations and Culture Organization (IRCO), which is de facto the
agency in charge IRIB’s cultural diplomacy initiatives. The mandate of
IRCO is to promote cultural linkages with other nations and communities;
consolidate the Islamic Republic’s cultural linkages with other states; offer
a proper presentation of Iran’s culture and civilization; prepare the
foundation for unity among Muslims; rebirth and promotion of Islamic
culture and teaching around the world; and broadcasting information
about the Islamic Revolution’s principles and reality.26
For information content, the IRIB is using mostly the IRNA press agency,
itself funded and controlled by the government and under the authority of
the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which beyond its 60
offices in Iran, oversees 30 more branches in various countries across of
the world. The aim is to maximize Iranian soft power by multiplying the
channels and languages used to circulate the regime’s message throughout
the planet.27 It is noteworthy that the official press agency, already
subordinated to the executive power, had its subordination to the regime
even further reinforced since the early 2000s.28 Lastly, the Ministry of
Information Technologies and Communications, the Islamic Republic’s
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main agency in charge of managing information and communication
systems, provides technical support to the audio-visual diplomacy. Beyond
the audio-visual diplomacy influence apparatus, the Ministry of
Intelligence and National Security VEVAK (acronym for Vezārat-e
Ettelā'at va Amniat-e Keshvar) has a discrete but crucial role in assisting
the IRIB in terms of propaganda and disinformation through the
production of documentaries praising the regime and its allies, or
denouncing its regional and extra-regional adversaries.29
Central audio-visual Medias and their target audience
Along with twelve national television networks and thirty provincial ones,
the IRIB manages four international television information networks, six
satellite-based TV networks for its international audience and thirty radio
stations. Broadcasts are achieved through shortwave radio and satellite, in
over 30 languages including Albanese, German, English, Arabic, Azeri,
Bosnian, Kurdish, Spanish, French, Hebrew, Italian and Russian – a wide
linguistic array attesting of Iran’s global ambitions and its foreign policy
target audiences.30 In addition to information programmes, the IRIB
produces every year 5,000 hours of television content, 300 films, and
20,000 minutes of animated film.31 The flagships of this audio-visual
diplomatic system are Press-TV, al-Alam, Jamejam, Al-Kawthar TV,
Voice of the Islamic Republic, Sahar Network, and Hispan-TV. The
following three illustrations show how much each of these are aiming at a
specific audience.
Launched during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the satellite-based network AlAlam [the Arab World] seeks essentially to address an Iraqi, Shiite, and
Arabic speaking audience. With offices in Teheran, Bagdad and Beyrouth,
and accessible on the entire Iraqi territory with a satellite dish, this
information network offers business, sport and cultural programmes. It
prides itself to offer an alternative to other satellite networks run by the
Gulf monarchies while conveying to an Arab population images favorable
to the Islamic Republic. Its coverage of the 33 Days War in the summer of
2006, for instance, emphasized the Iranian humanitarian aid geared
towards the reconstruction of Lebanon in view to enhance sympathy
towards the Islamic regime. As Saeid Golkar noted, these images were
well-received by many Muslim Arabs who had to suffer from feelings of
humiliation under colonial rule.32 This type of media operation allowed the
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Iranian network, according to some reports, to increase the legitimacy of
the Iranian regime in Iraq and in other countries in the region.33
The other Iranian satellite network, Press-TV, was launched in 2007 with
the hope of competing with other 24/7 information networks such as BBC
World News, RT, DD India, CNN, France 24, and Deutsche Welle. From
the onset, the Iranian authorities made its goal clear: The government
hopes to use Press-TV to counter what it considers as a flow of constant
Western propaganda against Iran, as well as to offer an alternate vision of
world news.34 With a budget of 25 million dollars, this 24/7 information
network targets Western audiences and broadcasts both in English and
French.35 Although it is also aimed at propping-up Iran’s international
reputation, Press-TV shows that these various networks are not subject to
a cookie cutter approach, but rather each of them is carefully designed and
operated according to the audience it seeks to reach. If the female news
presenters wear the hijab [tchador] on Al-Alam, on Press-TV they have a
more liberal outlook to include make-up and more colorful clothing, which
the Iranian national television networks prohibit. However, these public
relation efforts did not save Press-TV from criticism, as it faced regular
accusations of being a propaganda outlet for the Islamic regime and even
losing its licence in several European and Asian countries during the
2010s.36
Furthermore, in order to cultivate Iran’s image as a champion of Islamic
resistance against Western countries, Tehran’s audio-visual diplomacy
enhances its reputation as an anti-imperialist force in non-Muslim
countries, known in the past as the non-aligned, such as in Latin America
and sub-Sahara Africa.37 It is in this vein that in December 2013 was
launched Hispan-TV, IRIB’s Spanish language satellite-based networks.38
Supported by the “Middle East” desk of the English language news
network Press-TV, Hispan-TV also benefits since its launch from a
strategic partnership with the neo-Bolivarian television network Telesur.
In line with Iran’s forward defence strategy, this media breakthrough in
Latin America aims to communicate directly with South American people
and to create a permanent footprint in America’s courtyard.39
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New Medias and Private Networks
Beyond these major communications platforms, the Iranian audio-visual
diplomacy is at the leading edge in the region by its use of about one
hundred semi-official and non-official media’s providing the capacity to
privatize Iran’s influence activities and adapt its discourse to specific
audiences.40 For instance, in Bahrein, Tehran has been targeting the Shiite
population through the radio station Voice of the Republic and the satellite
TV network al-Sahar. The television and radio network Ahlulbayt,
supported by Iran, covers southern Iraq with religious programmes. The
television network Tamadon [Civilisation] broadcasts from Kabul and can
reach the Afghan elite through an extensive system of relays in which Iran
has heavily invested.41 Using a bureaucratic entrepreneur model, the
Iranian strategists also use regularly non-Iranian media’s. Iran employed
an “influence laundering” strategy in Afghanistan through a variety of
initiatives, such as the creation of a “union of local journalists,” with an
annual budget of 100 million dollars.42
Additionally, the Islamic Republic quickly grasped the influence stakes
involved with the Internet. Deploying its own story on the World Wide
Web, Iran has actively been exploiting social networks such as Twitter and
Facebook to conquer minds through an unprecedented access to vast
audiences.43 One of the pioneers in this field, the Islamic Republic News
Agency (IRNA), was one of the first to develop Iran’s e-diplomacy.
Conservative newspapers, such as Kayhān and Iran rapidly followed.44 AlAlam was launched in 2007 as an English-language website, and then in
Arabic and Persian, in order to increase its readership and foster its
reputation of being an impartial media. Similarly, Fars News, with
websites in Persian, English, Arabic, and Turkish, is a governmental press
agency linked to the Revolutionary Guards, and acts as one of the main
platforms for the regimes internet-based propaganda.
With more than 700,000 blogs in Persian, one of the top ten most used
languages for this type of media; the blogosphere has also been one of the
main frontlines for Iran’s public diplomacy campaigns. The Iranian
Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khamenei, the present president Hassan
Rohāni as well as his predecessors, Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud
Ahmadinejād, have used their own blogs to propagate both official policies
of the state and the ideology of the Islamic Republic. These blogs also aim
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at Persian-speaking people outside Iran, such as in Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, Bahrein, Oman, UAE, and even California, plus those written in
Kurdish, Tajik, and Dari, targeting other critical audiences for Tehran’s
audio-visual and internet diplomacy.
As for the more traditional media outlets, the Iranian regime favors an
approach combining bureaucratic supervision and entrepreneurial
delegation through non-official, private, or foreign intermediaries.45 This
mixed approach extends much beyond the Arabic/Muslim world. By the
end of 2018, informed observers accused Iran of using thousands of fake
private accounts on social media platforms such as Facebook to run a vast
worldwide disinformation campaign.46 Experts consider that the
Revolutionary Guards’ cyber branch to rank fourth in the world, and they
regularly suspect them to recruit foreign cyber-mercenaries to conduct
hacking operations but also for influence and political interference
purposes.47 This potpourri of genres involves also collaboration with other
states. In particular, the United States recently observed with concerns the
Iranian coordination of influence activities with China and Russia aiming
at disrupting internal American politics, as well as countering its interests
in its traditional spheres of influence.48
Through different channels and various initiatives, the Iranian regime
tries to damage its adversaries’ reputation while presenting an alternative
image of Iran, one of an independent Islamic and democratic nation
opposed to the United States and its allies in the Middle East.49 In spite of
fluctuations in shape and style, their message is constant and coherent,
which prompted Michael Rubin to note that the Iranian audio-visual
diplomacy “suffers from no editorial confusion,” and shows a remarkable
alignment with the rest of Tehran’s strategy.50

Conclusion
In this present context of increased tensions between Iran and the United
States, it would be unwise to gauge power relationships solely in hard
power metrics. The leadership of the Islamic Republic is fully aware that
they cannot promote Iran’s interest through direct confrontation against
its regional and extra-regional adversaries. Much like in China and Russia,
they still hope being able to compensate their relative weakness in the
traditional forms of power through an alternative approach emphasizing
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indirect means such as information, disinformation, subversion and mass
diplomacy.
Even if it is notoriously difficult to measure political power and influence,
Iran’s approach to influence through soft forms of power is not only
intrinsic to its national security culture but the country has given itself a
vast of array of tools that clearly outpace what the United States and its
allies are willing to put forward in the region.51 In this 21st century
hypermedia environment, where fights in the realm of public opinions are
increasingly central to any conflict, Iran has a clear advantage in the
region. Their strategy, partially delegated and decentralized, is likely to
increase the longevity of the regime, and allows it to continue pursuing its
forward defense approach while remaining below the threshold of direct
confrontation.
If indeed the United States is seeking to neutralize Iran’s subversive
influence in the Middle East as a key foreign policy goal, then it appears
that the most needed tools to meet this challenge are rather scarce, and
even worse, the mindset necessary to implement a viable strategy to
counter Iran’s influence is also missing. The previous American doctrine of
“strategic patience” might have been a better one, but policy-makers
should have used that time for actively re-tooling.
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